Offence of Criminal Conspiracy and PMLA

Adv M.S. Husain

Money Laundering
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Introduction:

Section 120A of the India Penal Code, 1860 defines ‘criminal conspiracy’ and section 120B provides its punishment. Enforcement Directorate has invoked 120B in many cases where other offences were not scheduled offences. PMLA was enacted in India in the year 2002. The main object of this Act is to rest the integration of the proceeds of crime with the mainstream economy. The proceeds of crime has been defined under Section 2(i)(u) of PMLA. Section 2(y) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) defines the 'schedule offence'. A bare perusal of very definition of 'proceeds of crime' shows that it is very much interlinked with the existence of scheduled offence.

Offence of Criminal Conspiracy and PMLA:
PMLA has been amended time to time and more offences have been included in the category of scheduled offence to widen the scope of PMLA to meet out its main aims and objects.
There have been instances wherein provisions of PMLA have been invoked retrospectively on the offences which were not scheduled offences at the time of its occurrence.
This issue came before the High Court of Karnataka. The allegation was that the accused therein committed the offences  under Sections 120-B, 420 and 411 of the IPC and Sections 13(2)   read with Sections 13(1)(d)  and 13(1)(e)   of the PC Act, 1988. The petitioner therein contended that the alleged offences were included as scheduled offences only on 01.06.2009 whereas the alleged offences were allegedly committed between June, 2007 and May, 2009. The Petitioner further contended that the said offences were allegedly committed prior to the coming into operation of the amendment to the PMLA.
The Karnataka High Court was of the view that the offenses alleged against the petitioner therein are not scheduled offenses under PMLA. Therefore, the petitioners therein could not be prosecuted under the provisions of PMLA.
Relevant paras of the Judgment dated 22.03.2017 titled as Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Joint Director Directorate of Enforcement Government of India and Ors. reported as MANU/KA/0545/2017, (passed by the High Court of Karnataka) are reproduced herein below:
"10. It can be seen from the records that all the offences allegedly committed by the writ petitioner were earlier to the insertion of the provision in the schedule of the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2009, and as such, they have no application.
11. Therefore, the Enforcement Case Information Report and the order of attachment are without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. As we have, already, held that the writ petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the offences alleged, as they are not the scheduled offences under the PML Act. Those offences under the Mines and Geology (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were included in the PML Act declaring them as scheduled offences only with effect from June 1, 2009. Hence, the Enforcement Directorate could not have invoked the provisions of the PML Act with retrospective effect.
12. The petitioner cannot be tried and punished for the offences under the PML Act when the offences were not inserted in the schedule of offences under the PML Act. This would deny the writ petitioner the protection provided under clause (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to penalty for ex-post facto laws. Consequently, the order of attachment is, also, liable to be set aside."

The Enforcement Directorate challenged the above-said judgment of the Karnataka High Court before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 24.07.2017 passed in Special Leave to Appeal Crl. No. 4466/2017 matter titled as 'Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt Ltd., held that-
"Leave granted. In the meantime, the impugned judgment and order will not operate as a precedent. Liberty is granted to file Rejoinder Affidavit within a period of 4 weeks from today."

The High Court of Madras dealt with the retrospective effect of PMLA and vide its  Judgment dated 13.07.2017 in a case titled as Ajay Kumar Gupta v. Adjudicating Authority (PMLA)reported as ­­­MANU/TN/2654/2017, held that-
"12. Similarly, the charge sheet was filed on 13.1.2009 under Section 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act, but this section was included in the list of Scheduled Offences under Prevention of Money Laundering Act is only on 1.6.2009. Therefore subsequent amendment cannot be given any retrospective effect…"

The above-said SLP pertaining to the judgment dated 22.03.3017 of Karnataka High Court (Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Joint Director Directorate of Enforcement Government of India and Ors.) is pending and as such final view of the Supreme Court is awaited on this important aspects of PMLA.
Invoking Section 120-B IPC when offences were not scheduled offences:
Section 120-B IPC defines meaning of criminal conspiracy. Enforcement Directorate has added 120-B in in many cases where other offences were not scheduled offences before the amendment of PMLA.
By adding Section 120-B IPC, provisions of PMLA have been invoked in such cases as well wherein the offences at the time of their occurrence were not including under PMLA as scheduled offences. Thus, with the aid of Section 120B IPC, the PMLA has been invoked retrospectively.
This issue came before various High Courts. High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in Ahsan Ahmad Mirza & Others v. Enforcement Directorate [WP(C) No. 2780/2019] , decided on 15.10.2019,held as under:
"29 I am persuaded to take the view which has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in the judgment supra, for, the view taken by the Karnataka High Court is the only correct view having regard to the settled legal position enumerated extensively in the several judgments of the Apex Court. It is beyond the pale of any doubt that offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B IPC is a stand alone offence and figures on top of Part A of the Schedule of PMLA. That being the position, it is difficult to accept the plea that unless the offence of criminal conspiracy is committed in conjunction with a scheduled offence, it cannot be taken to be a scheduled offence for the purpose of Section 3 read with clause (u) of Sub- section 1 of Section 2 of PMLA. Undoubtedly, the offence of money- laundering relates to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of the crime including its concealment possession, acquisition etcetra and 'proceeds of crime' would mean any property derived or obtained directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to scheduled offence. Once Section 120-B is held to be a distinct, independent and stand alone offence and is one of the scheduled offences under PMLA, any property derived or obtained by any person directly or indirectly as a result of criminal activity relating to the offence of conspiracy would come within the definition of 'proceeds of crime'. A fortiori, any process or activity connected with 'proceeds of crime' including its concealment, possession, acquisition etcetra as untainted property, shall come within the purview of offence of money-laundering as defined under Section 3 of PMLA. That being the position of law, no fault could be found with the investigation or action initiated by the respondents including issuance of summons in exercise of powers conferred by Section 50(2) and (50(3) of PMLA."

The Karnataka High Court in Sachin Narayan and Ors. v. The Income Tax Department and Ors. [MANU/KA/6286/2019], vide its judgment dated 29.08.2019, held as under:
"39. As to whether by a criminal conspiracy the offences indicated in the schedule to PML Act is made out or not would be an issue which can be unearthed only after investigation. During the course of investigation, the authorities may arrive at a conclusion that there is no necessity to further investigate the matter and it may drop the investigation or in the event of authorities finding there is some material, it may then proceed to adjudicate. It all depends on circumstances emerging from investigation in a given case.
40. If principles of interpretation is adopted, then, there was no necessity for the expression "conspiracy" being indicated in several enactments as found in the schedule to the PML Act. Section 120-B of IPC found in part-A of the schedule to PML Act refers to IPC offences only and if it was referable to other offences, the framers of law would not have incorporated the expression "conspiracy" under Part-A Paragraph -1 as defined under other enactments. Section 120-B is a predicate, distinct and stand alone offence. The inclusion of said offence under the schedule is not under challenge in these writ petitions."

Offence of Criminal Conspiracy cannot be alleged on mere suspicion:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgment in CBI v. K. Narayana Rao [(2012) 9 SCC 512], held that-
“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are that there should be an agreement between the persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing of an illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both and in a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances proved before and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. Even if some acts are proved to have been committed, it must be clear that they were so committed in pursuance of an agreement made between the accused persons who were parties to the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. In other words, an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence”.

Conclusion:
The very definition of conspiracy is very extensive. Offence of criminal conspiract under section 120B of IPC can be easily invoked where two or more persons are involved in a crime. In its plain reading, section 120B of IPC can be added to bring any offence (which was not the scheduled offence at the time of its occurrence) under the scope and ambit of the PMLA. In a way, by aiding Section 120B IPC, PMLA can be invoked retrospectively.
Final findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India are awaited on this issue.

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Section 44 of PMLA: Offences Triable by Special Court

Adv M.S. Husain
INTRODUCTION:

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
PMLA
Triggering point for the offence of money laundering is commission ‘scheduled offence’ provided under Schedule to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter ‘PMLA’). Once an FIR for ‘scheduled offence’ is registered, the authority registering FIR shall inform about the same to the Enforcement Directorate (ED). Thereafter ED shall register Enforcement Case Information Report (hereinafter, ECIR) and initiate investigation for the offence of money laundering. After investigation, ED shall file Prosecution Complaint (PC) or Charge-sheet against accused person before Special Court.

OFFENCE OF MONEY LAUNDERING TO BE TRIED BY SPECIAL COURT:
Offence of money laundering shall be tried by a Court designated as Special Court by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the concern High Court under section 43 of PMLA.  Hence offence of money laundering is triable by the Special Court under section 44 of PMLA.
Section 44 reads as under:
"44.     Offences triable by Special Courts.-
(l)         Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a)        an offence punishable under section 4 and any scheduled offence connected to the offence under that section shall be triable by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed:
Provided that the Special Court, trying a scheduled offence before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to try such scheduled offence; or
(b)        a Special Court may, upon a complaint made by an authority authorised in this behalf under this Act take cognizance of offence under section 3, without the accused being committed to it for trial.
(c)        if the court which has taken cognizance of the scheduled offence is other than the Special Court which has taken cognizance of the complaint of the offence of money-laundering under sub-clause (b), it shall, on an application by the authority authorised to file a complaint under this Act, commit the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court and the Special Court shall, on receipt of such case proceed to deal with it from the stage at which it is committed.
(d)        a Special Court while trying the scheduled offence or the offence of money-laundering shall hold trial in accordance with the provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as it applies to a trial before a Court of Session.
(2)        Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that section as if the reference to "Magistrate" in that section includes also a reference to a "Special Court" designated under section 43."
Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 44 of PMLA provides that on Application, Special Court (i.e. Session Court) shall also try ‘schedule offence’ along-with the complaint filed under section 4 of PMLA.
The said clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 44 incorporates a condition precedent that the above clause shall only be invoked if the scheduled offence is triable by a Court of Magistrate and not otherwise.
Since in a situation where scheduled offence is triable by a Court of Magistrate, an Appeal or Revision shall lie to the next Appellate or Revision Court i.e. Court of Session in terms of section 374, 378 or 397 Cr.P.C.
Section 374 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"374.   Appeals from convictions.-
(1)        Any person convicted on a trial held by a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court.
(2)        Any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or on a trial held by any other Court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed, may appeal to the High Court.
(3)        Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), any person,-
(a)        convicted on a trial held by a Metropolitan Magistrate or Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first class, or of the second class, or
(b)        sentenced under section 325, or
(c)        in respect of whom an order has been made or a sentence has been passed under section 360 by any Magistrate, may appeal to the Court of Session."

Section 378 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"378.   Appeal in case of acquittal.-
(1)        Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.
(2)        If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal.
(3)        No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.
(4)        If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
(5)        No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.
(6)        If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2)."

Section 397 of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
"397.   Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.-
(1)        The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.- All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 398.
(2)        The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding;
(3)        If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
In reference to above provisions, it is amply clear that the above said clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 44 appears to be violative of Right to Appeal/ Revision provided under above provisions of Cr.P.C. in a situation where ‘scheduled offence’ is triable by Magistrate and in that eventuality Right to Appeal/ Revision of accused or State against order of the Magistrate has been despoiled.
As we have discussed above that PMLA is not an independent Act and therefore provisions of PMLA won’t be attracted by its own. It will be attracted only on existence of scheduled offence/ predicate offence provided under Schedule to PMLA.
Right to Appeal to the higher Court is a basic human right which is based on statutory provisions, settled law, principle of natural justice, equity and fair play. Right to Appeal is one of the sound and basic fundamental principle which has been provided in both civil and criminal legislations.
In N.S. Abdul Gafoor & Anr. v. The Karnataka State Transport Authority & Ors. (2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1565), the Karnataka High Court on 15.03.2017 held that the statutory remedy of an appeal available to an aggrieved person cannot be curtailed by narrower interpretation.
In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement (2010) 4 SCC 772, the Supreme Court held as under:
"32. By referring to the aforesaid schemes under different Statutes, this Court wants to underline that the right of appeal, being always a creature of a Statute, its nature, ambit and width has to be determined from the Statute itself. When the language of the Statute regarding the nature of the order from which right of appeal has been conferred is clear, no statutory interpretation is warranted either to widen or restrict the same."
In Binod Kumar Sinha @ Binod Kumar & Others v. State of Jharkhand through Directorate of Enforcement (2013 SCC OnLine Jhar 373), a question as to whether the prosecution for scheduled offences as defined under the provision of PMLA is necessarily to be preceded the trial for the offence under section 3/4 of PMLA, came for consideration before the High Court of Jharkhand. Considering the same the High Court of Jharkhand held that "Accordingly, I do come to the conclusion unhesitatingly that the Special Court may proceed with the trial for the scheduled offence as well as trial of the offence punishable under the PMLA Act simultaneously. The question posed is answered accordingly".
However, the above-said issue needs further consideration, clarification and adjudication by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as question of important statutory right of appeal is involved.
It is important to understand that through the process of appeal, a person gets an opportunity to get any legal or factual error in an order or judgment corrected. Nevertheless, appeals against any judgment, or order, or sentence of a criminal court can only be preferred when it has been specifically provided in the statutes like as provided in section 374 of Cr.P.C. (to the convicted person) and 378 Cr.P.C. (to the prosecution). Thus, the right to appeal can only be exercised within the limits laid down by Cr.P.C. or any other law for the time being is in force and hence, this is a constricted right of an affected  person weather an accused, State or any third person who comes under the category of 'aggrieved person'.
Thus, the process of criminal justice has some serious consequences on an individual’s life, primarily on the right to life and personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

CONCLUSION:
Right of appeal or revision cannot be taken away and an accused cannot be deprived of a better procedure in view of the provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India as criminal proceedings are always related with personal liberty of a citizen and it has for reaching consequences as well. The right to appeal is a statutory right and where the statute has provided for an appeal, it has to be followed in the manner as the particular statute provides. (i) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Mohinuddin Jamal Alvi(2016) 12 SCC 608, inter-alia, rightly observed that “21.3. if the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it must be done in that manner alone. All other modes or methods of doing that thing must be deemed to have been prohibited…”. Accordingly, right of Appeal is a statutory right and must be governed by the statute which grants it and therefore, no further statute should alter, modify or override it.

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Whether NEET exam violate the fundamental rights of the minorities in India?

Adv M.S. Husain
Supreme Court of India
Supreme Court of India

In Christian Medical College Vellore Association v. Union of India and Others (2020 SCC OnLine SC 423) (decided by Arun Mishra, Vineet Saran and M.R. Shah, JJ. on 29.04.2020), a question arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that whether NEET exam violate the fundamental rights of the minorities in India?

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Considering the above question, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"58. Thus, we are of the opinion that rights under Articles 19(1)(g) and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India do not come in the way of securing transparency and recognition of merits in the matter of admissions. It is open to regulating the course of study, qualifications for ensuring educational standards. It is open to imposing reasonable restrictions in the national and public interest. The rights under Article 19(1)(g) are not absolute and are subject to reasonable restriction in the interest of the student's community to promote merit, recognition of excellence, and to curb the malpractices. Uniform   Entrance Test qualifies the test of proportionality and is reasonable.   The same is intended to check several maladies which crept into medical education, to prevent capitation fee by admitting students which are lower in merit and to prevent exploitation, profiteering, and commercialisation of education. The institution has to be a capable vehicle of education. The minority institutions are equally bound to comply with the conditions imposed under the relevant Acts and Regulations to enjoy affiliation and recognition, which apply to all institutions.  In case they have to impart education, they are bound to comply with the conditions which are equally applicable to all. The regulations are necessary, and they are not divisive or disintegrative. Such regulatory measures enable institutions to administer them efficiently. There is no right given to maladminister the education derogatory to the national interest. The quality of medical education is imperative to sub­serve the national interest, and the merit cannot be compromised. The Government has the right for providing regulatory measures that are in the national interest, more so in view of Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

59. The rights of the religious or linguistic minorities under Article 30 are not in conflict with other parts of the Constitution. Balancing the rights is constitutional intendment in the national and more enormous public interest. Regulatory measures cannot be said to be exceeding the concept of limited governance. The regulatory measures in question are for the improvement of the public health and is a step, in furtherance of the directive principles enshrined in Articles 47 and 51(A)(j) and enable the individual by providing full opportunity in pursuance of his objective to excel in his pursuit. The rights to administer an institution under Article 30 of the Constitution are not above the law and other Constitutional provisions. Reasonable regulatory measures can be provided without violating such rights available under Article 30 of the Constitution to administer an institution. Professional educational institutions constitute a class by themselves. Specific measures to make the administration of such institutions transparent can be imposed. The rights available under Article 30 are not violated by provisions carved out in Section 10D of the MCI Act and the Dentists Act and Regulations framed by MCI/DCI. The regulatory measures are intended for the proper functioning of institutions and to ensure that the standard of education is maintained and does not fall low under the guise of an exclusive right of management to the extent of maladministration. The regulatory measures by prescribing NEET is to bring the education within the realm of charity which character it has lost. It intends to weed out evils from the system and various malpractices which decayed the system. The regulatory measures in no way interfere with the rights to administer the institution by the religious or linguistic minorities.

60. Resultantly, we hold that there is no violation of the rights of the unaided/aided minority to administer institutions under Articles 19(1) (g) and 30 read with Articles 25, 26 and 29(1) of the Constitution of India by prescribing the uniform examination of NEET for admissions in the graduate and postgraduate professional courses of medical as well as dental science. The provisions of the Act and regulation cannot be said to be ultra vires or taking away the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India under Article 30(1) read with Articles 19(1)(g), 14, 25, 26 and 29(1). Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ petitions are disposed of."

Considering the above, it is understood that the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that prescribing a uniform examination of NEET for admissions in medical & dental courses did not violate rights of unaided/aided minority institutions under Articles 19(1) (g) & 30 read with 25, 26 & 29(1) of Constitution.

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